Digital fences: the financial enclosure of farmlands in South America

Latin America is the region with the greatest level of inequality in terms of land concentration in the world: 1% of rural landowners hold 51% of farmland. While the region as a whole already holds a high GINI index of 0.79, South America, however, leads with an index of 0.85, the highest concentration in the entire continent.1 2 The expansion of the agricultural frontier, induced mainly by the global demand for soybeans and meat, is the main factor aggravating poverty and the unequal access to land in South American countries, mainly in those regions labelled as priority zones for the expansion and investment of the agribusiness.

According to a FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) assessment carried out in 2000, around 2.8 billion hectares of arable land were available at the time in the world to expand the agricultural frontier, 80% of it in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, particularly in seven countries: Angola, Congo, Sudan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia.3 A review of the 2012 study decreased the extension of the “arable expansion zones” to 1.4 billion hectares by excluding marginal land (of low quality for agriculture), forest protection areas and non-agricultural areas, but including five other potential areas: Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Indonesia and Venezuela.4 Amid multiple post-2008 crises, the pressure on the control of land and resources of interest, such as water and biodiversity, increased considerably in these “land reserve zones”, either for productive use or as financial assets. On top of this, nature-based climate solutions to overcome the climate crisis, focused on using forests and other ecosystems as the main carbon stocks, end up intensifying even more the dispute over land reserves and real estate speculation around the world.
In this report, we assess the land situation in five agribusiness expansion and investment zones in South America: Orinoquia or the Llanos Orientales (Eastern Plains) in Colombia; Matopiba in the Brazilian Cerrado region; and -the regions located along the export corridor of the Paraná-Paraguay waterway- the dry Chiquitan forests of Bolivia, the Chaco Seco of Paraguay and the Argentinian Chaco. In these five expansion zones one can find:
  1. A high concentration of the best arable land in large properties, usually over two thousand hectares. Even in Bolivia, which imposes limits of up to five thousand hectares per owner, in the expansion zone of Santa Cruz and Beni, areas of up to six thousand hectares have been legalised and titled. In the Orinoquia region in Colombia, the average property reaches 10 thousand hectares, while 36% of the Argentinian surface is controlled by properties ranging from 10 to 20 thousand hectares. North from there, in Paraguay, 40% of the land is encased in 600 properties that are over 10 thousand hectares each. In the Brazilian Cerrado, one can now find estatesof over one million hectares with soy production;
  2. The prevailing use of these lands for soybean monocultures or livestock pastures destined for export, as well as a significant increase in the destructionof native vegetation resulting from the accelerated conversion of land use by the advance of the agricultural frontier. Of the 16.5 million hectares converted to agricultural use in Brazil in the last 10 years, 12 million of these were set apart for soybeans. Bolivia’s deforestation record stands out (five million hectares in 2019 alone), while 80% of the Argentinian Chaco was converted into land for pasture and agricultural production;
  3. The increased foreign control of land as well as of export-oriented logistical infrastructure, mainly by the export sector’s trading companies. The control of strategic port terminals by Cargill and COFCO in all these expansion zones, as well as the intense acquisition of Matopiba lands by pension and investment funds, are clear examples. The foreign takeover of the control of land is especially relevant in Paraguay, as it is estimated that 35% of its lands are under direct or indirect foreign control, whereas in the expansion zone of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, in Bolivia, 60% of its most productive lands are under the control of international corporations;
  4. Ongoing processes ofthe digitisation of land governance to resolve property rights through cadastre registration with land georeferencing have neglected collective territories in all the countries analysed, thus laying the groundwork to the handover of land to the land market;
  5. Massive individual titling of private properties and the suspension of collective titling and agrarian reform processes, including in Bolivia, ranked first in Latin America for its protection of collective territorial rights. In the Santa Cruz region, 1.8 million hectares of the best lands were excluded from land reform by the land cadastre and later titled to agricultural corporations;
  6. Specific laws and policies for attracting capital market investments in land, in logistics infrastructure and in agribusiness value chains, secured by rural assets created specifically as debt guarantee, such as land (or parcels of it), the future harvest or even “environmental services”. Clear examples of this are Colombia’s zones of interest for rural, economic and social development (ZIDRES), which are privileged beneficiaries of land and credit policies, as well as the transformation of agribusiness bonds in Brazil into movable assets, including those issued in foreign currency and managed by the financial market with tax exemptions in their transactions.
In all the countries studied, the georeferenced cadastres became a requirement both for the land regularisation process and to access other public and credit policies in the financial system for rural properties. This trend to digitise land governance and the natural resources linked to it, is being reinforced by the World Bank: it has allocated USD 45.5 million for the registration of the Brazilian Cerrado’s private rural properties in the rural environmental cadastre (CAR) and has also assigned USD 100 million to the multi-purpose cadastre in Colombia.
[ An in-depth analysis of the five countries covered by this report is available in Spanish and Portuguese here]

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Although the improvements in localisation technology and the measurement of property limits – called land governance digitisation – can contribute to the process of titling/identification of public, vacant, collective/community and private lands in order to claim back properties under illegal status, the enrollment in the cadastre by each landholder without being verified by the state, ends up validating the historic process of land grabs. In the five main areas of expansion in South America covered by this report, there is widespread individual titling in favour of those who first access digital precision systems (GPS), on public, vacant lands and on lands traditionally occupied by traditional peoples and communities. This is authentic digital land grabbing.

Even in Argentina and Paraguay, where these cadastres must be integrated with the information contained in real estate registries before deciding on property rights to land, the focus on the title and on the accuracy of the GPS measurement has been replacing the verification criteria related to the compliance with the social and environmental function of the land and to the nature of the occupation. Therefore, in the current trend, cadastres are being used as a new backing for property rights, validating wrongful titles derived from grabbing public lands and the territories of traditional peoples and communities. This is the case of Paraguay’s SIRT cadastre and the tierras mal habidas (lands illegally obtained), as well as Bolivia’s CAT-SAN, which gave registration priority of the best arable lands on dispute in Santa Cruz de la Sierra to agricultural corporations. Brazil currently allows, by means of a Decree, the regularisation of up to 1,500 hectares of public lands through CAR and on information provided by the applicant.
There is a clear focus on georeferencing in agribusiness expansion zones and almost exclusively over private rural properties, comprising the entirety, or part, of communal lands and agrarian reform settlements under collective land management. Even if communal lands are certified, public institutions and banks have been demanding their registration in the cadastres as private rural properties, which generates the overlap of several individual cadastres with collective lands, or even the deletion of these territories from the map.
Women from the OMMI organisation, from the community El Estribo. Paraguay. Credit: Nicolás Avellaneda – Plurales Foundation
This pressure to register them in the cadastre as private property occurs because public lands, collective/communal territories and agrarian reform settlements are inalienable and can not be used as debt guarantees, thus, hindering the way of the real estate and securities markets for financial investments based on rural assets on private property.
With this digital redesign of land use -focused on individual private property- and the land regularisation that has followed -based on individual titles to consolidate property rights, millions of hectares are being injected in the land market, in global value chains (including in “sustainable” ones) and in the stock market, since it is now possible to sell and use them in relation to debt.
It is from these virtual territories legalised by the cadastres that the main agents that operate the agribusiness value chain promote the idea of sustainable global chains, whose production would be deforestation-free.5 Once the crimes of the invasion of public lands and deforestation (as in the case of the CAR in Brazil) have been erased, from the moment they’re registered in the cadastres, the origin of the products in the value chain -mainly soya and meat- is re-issued, and are then validated as «sustainable» by the verification and traceability systems of the new technological infrastructure of these long chains, typical for commodities (Blockchain technology).6 But this doesn’t stop there. Out of sight from the map, out of mind from the world and the same satellite images that guarantee the land and the environmental compliance of private properties become systems of surveillance and criminalisation against peoples and communities that have been “erased” from their own territories, whose way of life has become a crime against property.
In addition to the “green” re-issue of the real estate market and the commodities chain, the issue of new financial securities on rural assets – such as land ownership and environmental services (green bonds) – is allowed. Its purpose: to provide a buffer for liquidity in the capital market and to leverage financing for production and infrastructure in the agribusiness value chain. Properties holding titles and georeferenced in the CAR and/or SIGEF (Land Management System) cadastres in Brazil, for example, represent the new guarantee for issuing financial securities on land and natural resources, such as the Environmental Reserve Quota (Cota de Reserva Ambiental – CRA) on one hectare of native vegetation or the agribusiness bonds, that have the land, the future harvest or environmental services as debt guarantee for loans obtained from investors, mainly foreigners. This way, the digitization of land governance and of its natural resources by linking georeferenced cadastre and the real estate registry becomes the new guarantee, as well as the means for the quick delivery of business transactions from land in this digital phase of the financial economy. An unprecedented concentration of land, natural resources and the agro-food system is underway, no longer by the agribusiness sector, but by a few actors from the financial market, further deepening the scarcity inherent to the corporate agrifood system.
It is not just a digital makeover of the surface that is underway, but a recomposition via images «with technological precision» of the history of landscapes, territories, agrobiodiversity and their peoples. As a rule, the territories of the «erased» peoples, identified as demographic «voids» or private properties, are precisely in the priority areas of agribusiness expansion and investment. These are contemporary arenas not only of land disputes, but of the right to exist, the right to other ways of life, other types of development and future possibilities outside the realm of private property and the financial market.
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BRAZIL – MATOPIBA
In 2000, the FAO identified the Cerrado region as the world’s most important agricultural expansion zone.7 In the following decade, MATOPIBA was defined by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) as “Brazil’s latest agricultural frontier”.8 Currently, the Cerrado region accounts for approximately 45% of the national agricultural area, responsible for 52% of the country’s soybean production with much of its land and logistics infrastructure handled by foreign agroindustrial conglomerates, like the agro ABCD, the Chinese Cofco Agri, but even by actors that are not part of the sector, like Brookfield Asset Management, Cresud Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Valiance Capital, Private Equity Patria Investimentos/Blackstone and other foreign investment funds such as the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America – TIAA and Harvard Endowment.9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
An unimagined financialisation of land, natural resources and the agro-food system is underway in Brazil, mainly through a credit system financed by the capital market and no longer controlled by the State, which demands an ever-increasing release of land as private property, the main guarantee for financing, and a debureaucratisation of land regularisation processes to speed up land titling.18 Land digitisation is crucial for this.
The Cajueiro (MA) community in Brazil struggling for the right to exist has its houses destroyed for the construction of the private port in the region by the WTorre construction company, in association with China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) Photo : Vias de Fato @Media Ninja

The deletion of collective territories and the digital redesign of land as private property through the Rural Environmental Cadastre (CAR) is evident: as of March 2019, only 6% of the territory available for cadastration (34.5 million hectares) in the CAR information system (SICAR) was acknowledged as indigenous land, quilombola territories and territories of traditional peoples and communities, although official data indicates that indigenous territories solely account for 117 million hectares or 13.7% of the national territory.19 20 However, although official government databases point out that about 43% of the country’s territory consists of private areas, 91% of it was declared private rural property in the land cadastre of the national rural registration system (SNCR), an increase of one third from 2016 to 2018, following the approval of the so-called “Land Grab Act”. 21 22

COLOMBIA – ORINOQUÍA
In 2016 Colombia created the zones of interest for rural, economic and social development (ZIDRES: Zonas de Interés de Desarrollo Rural, Económico y Social) so that public and vacant lands of any size could be granted by contract/concession and for an unspecified span of time to the agroindustry, breaking with what had been the norm until then, of privileging the allocation of public lands to the most vulnerable categories of people from the countryside, indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants and victims of the armed conflict. In addition to the subsidised land concession, economic operations based in the ZIDRES are the main recipients of development and funding benefits with privileged credit lines.23

Cattle in the «llanos». Credit: ©2011CIAT/NeilPalmer @Flickr

Of the approximately 7.2 million hectares (6.2% of the territory) authorised to be used as ZIDRES, 5.5 million hectares are in the Llanos Orientales or Orinochia (76.3%), of which 4.8 million are in Vichada (66%) and 2.3 million in Meta (32%), the main departments of the ecorregion.24 This has resulted in the establishment of an authentic market of public lands – of the baldíos de la Nación – in the region. The irregular accumulation of baldíos (wastelands) is especially intense in Orinochia, mainly in the region of Altillanura, considered the last agricultural frontier of Colombia and the place with the highest land concentration in the country, with properties extending on average beyond 10 thousand hectares.25

The registration of these extensive wastelands as private properties in the multipurpose cadastre – the electronic land information and georeferencing system in Colombia – lays the groundwork for the consolidation of private property over public lands and their insertion in the land market. Although the cadastre does not require property registration records and, therefore, cannot justify the issuance of titles that confer the right to own land, the World Bank is committed to the integration of cadastre and land registration systems, with funding of USD 100 million, through the IBRD, having as goal the digitisation of 100% of the country’s territory through the issuance of 67 thousand titles covering 1.5 million hectares by 2025.26
ARGENTINA – CHACO
Argentina has also been integrating territorial information based on geospatial precision technology, but unlike Brazil and Colombia, the spatial cadastre is already connected to the real estate registration system that issues property rights titles. Although the information contained in the cadastre and in the property’s registration documents must match, there is no general rule as to how to verify the origin of the title, the nature of the possession or the fulfillment of the social function of the land before validating the titles. Each province is allowed to define its own procedure for land regularisation and issuance of the cadastral certificate. This document constitutes, modifies or transfers property rights in the country.27 The national program of rural titling (ProntAR) also allows private property regularisation over public lands in favour of cooperatives and agricultural consortia that demonstrate peaceful and uninterrupted possession.
Argentina, Gran Chaco, Salta; Wichi girl herding goats. Credit : WestEnd61

Whereas those who do not have access to georeferencing technology are not entitled to a cadastral certificate and the title, the integration of geospatial information without proper analysis of the registration documents and of the nature of possession may end up endorsing the historic land grab of public lands, especially in favour of foreigners, given the deregulation of the limits to land access by foreigners that has been implemented since 2016 by the Macri government.28 Until 2017, 40,216.5 hectares received land titles and benefited 1,040 farmers (usually related to livestock production). In its report the government doesn’t clarify, though, whether those benefiting were small, medium or large farmers, individuals or legal entities, nationals or foreigners.29

Property titling is fundamental to the process of financing the rural credit system in Argentina, which has been mainly leveraged since the 2000s by the creation of trusts (fideicomissum) through investment funds. These then hold land as a guarantee, as well as by the issuance of securities on production, such as warrants, issued even in dollars and only to foreign actors.30 31 Between 2004 and 2008, the creation of temporary trust in the rural sector increased by 271%, and according to the 2018 Census, 208 trusts (fideicomissum) held 235 thousand hectares in the country. 3233
The expansion across Latin America of Argentinian mega-companies like Los Grobo was driven by the creation of trusts (fideicomissum). In turn, warrants with financial guarantees accounted for 87% of the certificates issued in 2018, representing around USD 806 million.
PARAGUAY – CHACO
Government incentives have been continuously promoting plots of land at bargain prices in the Paraguayan Chaco, either through credit policies or by the subsidised regularisation of the illegal land grab of public lands. Of the 7.8 million hectares of public land or those bought with the use of public budget from 1954 to 2003 and granted illegally in the country (the so-called tierras mal habidas), 80% are located in the Chaco region.34 On average, 4,600 hectares were allocated per person, mainly to politicians, local elites and military personnel.35
In 2014, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Land Resources Information System (LRIS) was created to identify the geographic and registration situation of the fiscal lands granted by the state and to update the situation of the 1,011 peasant colonies of the eastern region through the institute for rural and land development (INDERT) in order to initiate the procedures for the return of «wrongly held» lands (tierras mal habidas), according to article 47 of the Agrarian Statute. Although INDERT should verify the origin of the title, the type of occupation and the socio-environmental function of the land, as well as if the holder meets the criteria of an agrarian reform beneficiary to validate the registration at the georeferenced cadastre, INDERT considers legitimate those titles that have already been paid for, even irregular ones that have simply been registered on the SIRT cadastre.36
Construction of a new paved landing strip at the Infante Rivarola airfield , with access from the Transchaco Route. Credit : MOPC – Ministry of Public Works and Communications of Paraguay
The enrollment in the cadastre has served to cover up and legitimise wrongful titles and illegal possessions in the settlements, orchestrating an authentic digital land grab of the tierras mal habidas.37 Once dully titled and recognised, the lands “legally” obtained by this digital makeover are injected into the land market and end up backing up rural assets as debt guarantees in favour of foreign investors, the same that have historically dominated the agribusiness value chain in Paraguay.38 Backed by rural assets, it is through the capital market that financialised agribusinesses intend to transform the Chaco region into a zone of development and investment. To that end, investors envision turning the region into an international transport hub, which would triple to around USD 5 billion the annual value of the commodities transported through the Transchaco highway (Route number 9), the main export corridor for the region’s production to the port terminals in the Paraguay-Parana waterway.39
BOLIVIA – CHIQUITINIA (SANTA CRUZ AND BENI)
Although rough figures point to a greater land extension set apart for indigenous peoples and/or collective and community titles, about 70% of the best arable lands in the country are reserved and titled in favour of agribusiness companies, particularly international ones, located in the Chiquitania region.40 41
During the process of land redistribution and titling in Bolivia (saneamiento de las tierras), priority zones were identified. This was in the framework of the national land management project, financed by the World Bank (1992-1995) and associated with another project of the bank called Proyecto de Tierras Bajas del Este.42 43 These zones were meant to guarantee the right to property over those lands with the best agricultural potential in the country. The goal: to build an economic framework for the commercial production of soybeans for export. These priority zones were composed of areas under dispute in terms of possession and ownership, which were, therefore, supposed to carry out the Integrated Land Use Cadastre ( Saneamiento Integrado al Catastro, CAT-SAN), a modality that combines the registration of the property in public registries with the enrollment in a legal cadastre containing georeferenced information about the property, offering priority on property rights in the event of overlapping titles over the same area. Of the 2.5 million hectares identified as priority zones, 1.8 million are in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, according to the company INYPSA hired by the World Bank.44 45

Area affected by forest fires that destroyed hectares of forest in Robore, Bolivia, August 19, 2019. Credit : Santa Cruz Department via REUTERS

As a result of this program, there was an increase in titles given to medium-sized properties and agricultural companies, especially foreign ones. It is estimated that transnational companies like ADM, Cargill and Bunge, as well as financial actors such as the Venezuelan investment group Gravetal, control directly or indirectly (contract farming) about 60% of the most productive lands in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. 46 47 48

The individual titling of properties was essential to introduce arable land in the land market, considering that the Community Land of Origin (tierras comunitarias de origen – TCOs) and community properties cannot be commercialised; they cannot be sold or given as guarantee. Individual titling of properties was also essential if access to land was to be given to foreign companies, as the sale or assignment of public land to foreigners in Bolivia is prohibited. The individual private digitisation and titling program of fiscal lands (whether small, medium or large) was the first step towards facilitating the handover of land to foreign capital, either through sale or contract, and therefore establishing the special agribusiness investment zone in Chiquitania.
RESISTANCE OF TERRITORIES:
– Comprehensive land reform and collective territories against the commodification and financialisation of land, natural resources and the agro-food system. Collective territories, agrarian reform settlements (for a fixed period, usually over 10 years) and public lands are lands out of the real estate market, such as commodities, and the securities market, as assets in the financial market. As they cannot be sold, leased (with exceptions) or offered for debt enforcement by financial institutions, they are territories of resistance to the process of commodification and financialisation of land, resources and the food system.
 
– Access to land is not land regularisation. A constitutional and legal provision exists in all countries where these areas of agribusiness expansion exist, that allows the priority allocation of public lands to the collective territories of indigenous peoples and traditional communities, as well as to the beneficiaries of agrarian reform settlements.Before creating any land regularisation program based on the issuance of individual property titles, it is the obligation of states and multilateral funding agencies such as the World Bank to allocate public and private lands recovered due to irregularities to indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, traditional communities and to those benefiting from agrarian reform.
– Land governance digitisation cannot generate property rights. Geo-referenced cadastres cannot be legal criterion to support the legality of titles registered in public registry offices or of land tenure. Otherwise, the process of land digitalisation risks turning into a real redesign of the surface focused on private property, opening the gates to a massive digital land grab.
– Prior to cadastres and titling, we must build binding systems of verification and constantly monitor the fulfilment of the social and environmental function of the land. The verification and monitoring of the compliance with the social and environmental function of the land, of the origin of the possession (non-violent) and of the validity of the titles registered based on the survey of the history of the chain of title, are that which allow public or private property, individual or collective, to be protected in any State, whether liberal or social.
– Digital land cadastres cannot be a requirement to access public policies and rural credit, at the risk of excluding from land those who do not have access to it, cannot pay for georeferencing or even register as a collective territory. The massive investment by the World Bank to enroll land in these cadastres as private property – whether small, medium or large – has contributed to the deletion of collective territories and their insertion in the land market.
– Private ownership of land does not mean ownership of the natural resources, called “environmental services”. Forests, native vegetation, water, biodiversity and their environmental functions are not part of the rural patrimony of the owner. In all Western democratic constitutions the environment makes up the core of human rights in regards to human dignity. This means that it is a non pecuniary asset, neither public nor private, protected by the legal regime of community property that cannot be appropriated (not even by state entities) and sold on the market like any other commodity. These environmental elements belong to no one. They are destined to all the present and future generations, especially to the traditional peoples and communities that protect them and have used them as a source of survival for thousands of years. The appropriation of these resources by the land owner or by financial titles excludes all, including future generations, from the equitable access to the means that enable life to grow, threatening life itself on the planet.
– Financialisation creates scarcity. The issuing of financial assets or securities on land ownership (or on parcels of land) and on community assets that do not comprise rural assets, such as environmental services (native vegetation, water and biodiversity) must be prohibited. The transformation of land as a value into shares aims to give liquidity to the financial market, placing land (or fractions of it) and its resources, such as crops and so-called «environmental services», in the hands of a few financial agents, who go on to control and speculate on land prices, carbon and biodiversity markets and on agricultural commodities, endangering the entire food system.
Furthermore, the commitment to leverage financing for environmental management through the financial market by issuing environmental assets (green bonds) leads to an even greater scarcity of environmental goods to be protected. Within the logic of supply and demand and the typical speculations of financial assets, the scarcer a commodity is, the higher its market value will be. In an extractive economy that causes scarcity of forests and native vegetation, through high rates of deforestation, scarcity of clean air, climate deregulation, and with increasing emissions of greenhouse gases, the green assets that these scarce natural resources represent will be increasingly valued in financial market. The higher the profit of the extractive economy of agribusiness and oil, the higher the profit of the financialised green economy, thus rendering it ineffective for the management of the environment. The appropriation and financialisation of land and natural resources are mechanisms that induce greater scarcity.
The collective stewardship of biodiverse lands by the world’s indigenous peoples, traditional and peasant communities for nearly 12,000 years is what has preserved the environment and the supply of food and nutritional diversity for all of humanity. Therefore, the real alternatives lie in keeping the essentials outside the realm of property and markets.
This report contains:
  • Map of Expansion Zones and Savannah Ecoregions
  • Map of logistics infrastructure in the expansion zones
  • Map of Corporations and Investment Funds in the Expansion Zones
  • Map of logistics infrastructure and agribusiness actors in areas of expansion
  • Table detailing the map features
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Acknowledgments: Junior Aleixo, PhD researcher at the Postgraduate Program of Social Sciences in Development, Agriculture and Society (CPDA/GEMAP/UFFRJ), who collaborated with data and the review of the report; Eduardo Barcelos, professor at the Instituto Federal Baiano (IFBAIANO), responsible for the cartography/maps in the report.
 
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1 The GINI index measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of access to land between landowners/land occupiers in a given region and period of time. “Zero” indicates maximum equality of access to land and “one” indicates maximum inequality. Thus, the index measures the relative inequality between those who own the land and not its concentration, excluding landless workers, for example. Only recently have countries’ census begun to include categories of collective land possession and ownership, such as the indigenous territories as well as the territories of Afro-descendant and traditional communities, which has also masked census data.
2 OXFAM, Desterrados: Tierra, poder y desigualdad en America Latina , 2016, p.25. Available at: https://www.cpalsocial.org/documentos/320.pdf
3 This figure does not take into account the non-agricultural uses of these lands, such as mining, infrastructure, human settlements and areas of environmental protection. In FAO and Fischer et al.(2000) Perspectivas por sectoresprincipales. 2000 in Agricultura Mundial: hacia los años 2015/2030. Available at:http://www.fao.org/3/y3557s/y3557s08.htm
4 Meanwhile, FAO projects the growth of around 70 million hectares in the world by 2050, with an increase of 132 million hectares in developing countries, especially in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, and a decrease of 63 million hectares in developed countries. In Nikos Alexandratos y Jelle Bruinsma, World Agriculture towards 2030/2050: the 2012 revision. Rome: FAO, 2012 2012. P. 10-12.Available at:http://www.fao.org/3/a-ap106e.pdf
5 Cargill, ADM and other companies showed in their 2020 reports that almost 100% of the soybeans bought in Brazil and in the MATOPIBA region come from zero deforestation zones. Two main problems: 1. Identifying sustainability only by the absence of deforestation; 2. Adopting the parameters of “legal” deforestation of the Forest Code, which legalised illegal deforestation carried out until 2008 with the adhesion to CAR (self-declaratory) – this concerns 29 million hectares throughout Brazil and permits for more than 88 million hectares of legal deforestation. Therefore, compliance with the Forest Code means granting forgiveness for years of illegal use of property. Please check the 2020 Cargill’s report, which uses CAR as a synonym for legalised ownership: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b48c2572487fdd7f1f29d1c/t/5cb0af23e2c483e4f71058ba/1555083 ; https://www.cargill.com/doc/1432166466608/soy-progress-mid-year-report-2020-en.pdf045257/DP_Monitoring_Web.pdf and ADM’s report available at: https://assets.adm.com/Sustainability/2019-Reports/2019-Soy-Progress-Report.pdf. Accessed on 11 September 2020.
6 Blockchain has been literally built as a blockchain that records the information of all transactions in a cashbook on a permanent manner (impossible to be undone), capable of being tracked by users, which would provide a reliable, secure digital infrastructure to ensure the step-by-step compliance of global value chains. Microsoft and IBM are developing it.
7 Landers, 2001, p.39 in Diana Aguiar, As veias abertas para a expansão do capital: tensões territoriais no projeto de transformação do Tapajós em corredor logístico.UFRJ.2019, p. 84.
8 United States Department of Agriculture. Foreign Agricultural Service. Brazil’s Latest Agriculture Frontier in Western Bahia and Matopiba. 26 July 2012. Available at: https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2012/07/Brazil_MATOPIBA/
9 In 1975, the Cerrado region accounted for 9% or 540 thousand hectares of the soybean production in the country, whereas 20% of the area corresponded to corn, 22% to cotton and 25% to sugarcane. In 2015, these numbers jumped to 52% or 17.4 million hectares of soybean production; 49% corresponded to corn, totalling seven million hectares; 98% to cotton production; and 49% to the sugarcane production, totalling five million hectares. In EMBRAPA, INPE & IPEA. Dinâmica Agrícola no Cerrado. Análises e projeções. 2020 p. 42 e 44 -45. Available at: https://ainfo.cnptia.embrapa.br/digital/bitstream/item/212381/1/LV-DINAMICA-AGRICOLA-CERRADO-2020.pdf
10 ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus.
11 Cofco Agri is a branch of the Chinese state-owned corporation Cofco International, a producer and trader in the global supply chains of grains, oil seeds, coffee and sugar. The conglomerate bought 100% of Noble Agri’s capital and currently controls Nidera’s plants, silos and warehouses in South America. Available at: https://www.cofcointernational.com/
12 “Harvard’s land grabs in Brazil are a disaster for communities and a warning to speculators”, 2020. Available at:https://grain.org/e/6456
13 Brookfield Asset Management is a Canadian investment fund that has been in Brazil for about 120 years, place where its first investment plaza was established.
14 Mitsui is one of the most important conglomerates in Japan. They operate in the agro-food chain and in financial services. In Brazil, they invest in land through a joint venture with SLC Land Co.; more specifically, in two farms located in São Desidério (BA) and Porto dos Gaúchos (MT). They also control Agrícola Xingu S/A, which also owns land in São Desidério (BA).
15 Mitsubishi Corporation is represented in Brazil by its subsidiary Agrex do Brasil. It acts as producer, supplier of agricultural inputsand landowner in the states of Maranhão, Tocantins and Piauí, accounting for 28 thousand hectares. Available at: http://www.agrex.com.br/nossos-negocios/producao-agricola
16 Pátria Investimentos has land in the states of Bahia, Tocantins and Mato Grosso. It also manages the Miritituba port in Itaituba (PR) through the company Hidrovias do Brasil and has the concession for expansion of highway BR 163, which connects Sinop (MT) to Port, it also has investments from Temasek, a Canadian investments fund, and from the International Finance Corporation, the investments branch of the World Bank.
17 According to the CCR report, these financial funds controlled 868,488 hectares of land in the Matopiba region, although it is known that these figures are underestimated.
18 According to information from the Ministry of Economy, in 2019 alone there were approximately R$ 160 billion invested in LCA, R$ 40 billion in CRA and R$ 9 billion in CDCA. In Junior Aleixo, “A Lei do Agro e a busca por uma ‘nova safra de proprietários”. Available at: https://jornalggn.com.br/desenvolvimento/a-lei-do-agro-e-a-busca-por-uma-nova-safra-de-proprietarios-por-junior-aleixo/
19 “Regularização ambiental e fundiária tensionam pela massiva privatização das terras públicas e territórios coletivos no Brasil”, 2019. Available at: https://grain.org/e/6219
20 Data from the Fundação Nacional do Índio (Funai, Brasil). Available at: http://funai.gov.br/index.php/indiosno-brasil/terras-indigenas. Accessed 29 April 2020.
21Sparoveck et al. “Who owns Brazilian lands? Land use police 87”, 2010. Atlas da Agropecuária Brasileira (Imaflora/Geolab/Esalq). Available at: www.imaflora.org/atlasagropecuario.
22 Paul Alentejano, “O mistério do crescimento exponencial das terras cadastradas no Incra e a MP 910: prenúncio de um crime em andamento”, Outras Mídias, May 5, 2020.: https://outraspalavras.net/outrasmidias/alerta-grilagem-de-terras-dispara-no-pais/. Accessed on 11 September 2020.
23 The ZIDRESs cannot or could not be established on priority areas such as the entitled indigenous reserves or the areas in the process of entitlement, collective territories of black communities, peasant reserve zones, and strategic ecosystems, natural parks and wetlands. However, UPRA considered the reserves delimited and approved by ANT, excluding the other areas claimed. In Áreas de referencia para identifición de ZIDRES, Metodología para estimación indicativa, UPRA, 2018. P. 38-39. Available at: http://bibliotecadigital.agronet.gov.co/handle/11438/8641
24 The Zidres also reach 5.5% of the area of the department of Casanare (404.4 ha) and 3.7% of the area of the department of Arauca (268.5 ha). Ibid. p. 85-87.
25 Atillanura is a sub-region of Orinoquia, comprised by the municipalities of Puerto López, Puerto Gaitán and Maripiripán in the department of Meta, and La primavera, Cumaribo, Puerto Carreño and Santa Rosalía in the department of Vichada. In this sub-region, family agricultural units (UAFs), the minimum unit of the rural property, can reach 1,300 hectares.
26 Project No. 165294 Available at: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P162594. See alsohttps://www.larepublica.co/economia/el-recaudo-municipal-subira-27-billones-con-el-nuevo-catastro-multiproposito-2902917Accessed on 11 September 2020.
27 The cadastre becomes the legal foundation for the issuance and legitimacy of property titles in the country in accordance with Act 26,209/2007.
28 Decree 820/16 amended Act 26,737/2011 and eased the former criteria by excluding from the limitation of access to land by foreigners lands under usufruct, surface, use, dwelling and antichresis. Rural properties located in areas considered “Industrial Zones’ or that develop renewable energy production projects are also no longer subject to the limitations of acquisition by foreigners, opening thus to the international market the “green transition” economy. In addition, only companies that have more than 51% of their capital controlled by foreign companies are considered foreign. The previous limit was 25%.
29 Informe de gestión 2016-2017. Dirección Nacional de Tierras y Unidades Agropecuarias. Available at: https://www.magyp.gob.ar/sitio/areas/tierras/informe_de_gestion/180803_informe_de_gestion.pdf
30 Fiduciary property is a temporary property on behalf of the fiduciary creditor (usually banks and, most recently, investment funds) usually in exchange for real estate funding (widely used in construction). Act 24,441/94 allowed the creation of temporary legal entities by investment funds, who now detain rural assets as loan guarantees to leverage investments in the agribusiness sector. In S. Frederico; C. Gras, “Globalização financeira e land grabbing: constituição e translatinização das megraempresas argentinas”. In J. A. Bernardes et al., (orgs.), 1º Edition. Globalização do agronegócio e land grabbing: a atuação das megaempresas argentinas no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Lamparina, 2017. p. 11-32 .
31 Issued by any farmer who owns rural production, including in dollars. They are more common during the soybean harvest, from May to June, and are regulated by Act 9,643. Available at: https://www.warrantsnet.com/port-warrants-1.html. Accessed on 11 September 2020.
32 D. Fernández, “Concentración económica en la región pampeana: el caso de los fideicomisos financeiros”, Mundo Agrario, v. 11, n. 21, 2010.
332018 National Agricultural Census, which refers to the reference period that dates from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018. Available at: https://cna2018.indec.gob.ar/informe-de-resultados.html P.91
34 Among the irregularities, the attribution to people who do not meet the requirements of beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, as well as the titling of more than one parcel per beneficiary, resulting in entire soybean agrarian colonies with irregular titles.
35 Paraguay’s truth and justice commission (CVJ) pointed out that, during the regime of dictator Alfredo Stroessner, agrarian reform lands were illegally allocated, mainly by and for politicians and the military personnel. Among the beneficiaries, Carlos Casado’s S/A group was the most emblematic one, accumulating a total of 6 million hectares in the region. In Comisión de Verdad y Justicia Paraguay (2008). “Informe Final: Tierras Mal Habidas”. Tomo IV. Available at: http://www.derechoshumanos.net/lesahumanidad/informes/paraguay/Informe_Comision_Verdad_y_Justicia_Paraguay_Conclusiones_y_Recomendaciones.htm. The Truth Commission report would be delivered to President Lugo, deposed from office in August 2008, and the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry would have started the procedures to recover the “tierras mal habidas”; however, until today, no illegal title has been declared void and no property has been recovered, nor were political and institutional leaders sentenced.
36 Inés Franceschelli. “Bajo el manto de la modernidad, se oculta mejor el histórico despojo”. BASE-IS http://www.baseis.org.py/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Bajo-el-manto-de-la-modernidad-.pdfAccessed on 11 September 2020.
37 A bill for land registration is under discussion in the country in order to create the national system for public cadastre enrollment and registration (SINACARE). It was submitted by the rural sector without any debate with society and, as takes place in Brazil, it aims at facilitating the regularisation of public land as private property. BASE-IS, August 2020. Available in: https://www.baseis.org.py/ley-de-registro-unico-de-tierras-las-trampas-del-mercado/.Accessed on 11 September 2020.
38 Paraguay Agricultural Corporation (PAYCO), for example, is the result of investments made by the German Investment and Development Corporation (DEG) with RíoForte, the financial branch of the Portuguese group Espiritu Santo, and now has direct ownership over 136 thousand hectares of land throughout the country, as well as over 11 thousand hectares obtained through lease agreements. Available in : http://payco.com.py/#/es/presencia_en_paraguay
39 The highway was funded by the US Mennonite Central Committee. Available at: https://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/bloomberg/2019/07/22/paraguai-quer-transformar-regiao-do-chaco-em-hub-de-transporte.htm. Mennonite cooperatives own approximately two million hectares in the Chaco region and, together with the Uruguayans and the Brazilians, they dominate the milk and meat sectors. Association of Mennonite Colonies of Paraguay (ACOMEPA). Available at: http://acomepa.com/. Accessed on 11 September 2020.
40 According to INRA data about titled land in the country: 28% corresponds to indigenous territories (TCO – Community Land of Origin); 27% corresponds to community ownership by peasants and intercultural communities; 14% corresponds to average properties and agricultural companies; and 31% to public fiscal lands. Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA/2018).
41 66% of the country’s arable land is in the Chiquitania and 70% in the department of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In Agricultural Census, 2013, Bolivia. La Paz, Bolivia: National Institute of Statistics, 2015. Available at: http://censosbolivia.ine.gob.bo/censofichacna/. See also: «Denuncian ‘descarada’ privatización de las tierras fiscales en favor del agro cruceño», 2020. Available in:http://www.ftierra.org/index.php/tema/tierra-territorio/934-denuncian-descarada-http://www.ftierra.org/index.php/tema/tierra-territorio/934-denuncian-descarada-privatizacion-de-tierras-fiscales-en-favor-del-agro-cruceno. Accessed on 11 September 2020.
42 Technical and financial cooperation from the World Bank for the preparation of the national land management project (PNAT) from 1992 to 1995, responsible for creating and operating INRA and executing CAT-SAN to consolidate about 3 million hectares with successive credits of USD 24.7 million and 7.5 million. In: COLQUE; INK and SANJINÉS. Segunda Reforma Agraria: una historia que incomoda. Fundación Tierra. 2016, p. 141-150. Available at: http://www.ftierra.org/index.php/publicacion/libro/151-segunda-reforma-agraria-una-historia-que-incomoda
43 A funding worth USD 50 million by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to expand soybean production in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, which included the construction of productive and transport infrastructure as well as rural credit mechanisms and land use plans. In Enrique C. Balliván, “Empresas Transnacionales em el agronegócio soyero”. Fundación Tierra. 2017, p.18-19. Available at: http://www.ftierra.org/index.php?option=com_mtree&task=att_download&link_id=169&cf_id=52
44 This modality would be required for areas: i) with technical and/or legal irregularities in agrarian procedures; ii) under conflict over property rights; iii) with evidence of non-compliance with the economic and social function of the land; iv) under land possession but without title; and v) executing projects of public interest. In: Op.cit. Colque et al. 2016, p 149-150. CAT-SAN gained approximately USD 70 million from international cooperation as well as external credits from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Nordic Development Fund, USAID, among others. The funding was granted to foreign companies that were the main executors of the land titling program, using georeferencing technology and measuring parcels by satellite imagery.
45 Spanish company specializing in planning management as well as in geoinformation and georeferencing service. It carried out the digitization to adjudicate two million hectares through CAT-SAN in Santa Cruz and La Paz. In Colque et al. op. cit. 2016. p.147.
46 Enrique C. Balliván, 2017, op.cit., p. 25 -28.
47 In contract farming, both land and labour are subordinated to the global commodity chain through production contracts signed with the major traders of the sector. In addition, the contract also entails the acquisition of certain inputs, usually imported, with the application of intellectual property, such as fertilizers, pesticides, and conventional and transgenic seeds. Pesticides and seeds usually represent the most relevant part of operating costs, reaching 60% of costs in Bolivia.
48 Comunicaciones Aliadas, “Bolivia: Acelerado proceso de extranjerización de tierras,” 14 August 2018 : https://www.farmlandgrab.org/28372. Accessed on 11 September 2020.
Source and Image: https://grain.org/en/article/6529-digital-fences-the-financial-enclosure-of-farmlands-in-south-america
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Aumentan los milmillonarios de América Latina, la región más desigual del mundo: Oxfam

La fortuna de los 73 milmillonarios de América Latina aumentó en 48 200 millones de dólares desde el comienzo de la pandemia, incluso ahora cuando la región es una de las más afectadas del mundo, afirma Oxfam hoy. 

La región ha visto surgir en promedio un nuevo milmillonario cada dos semanas desde marzo, mientras que millones de personas siguen luchando contra la enfermedad, dificultades económicas extremas y por poner comida en la mesa durante los confinamientos, con los hospitales al borde del colapso.

En conjunto, los 42 milmillonarios del Brasil aumentaron su patrimonio neto de 123 100 millones de dólares en marzo a 157 100 millones de dólares en julio, mientras que los siete más ricos de Chile vieron como su patrimonio conjunto aumentaba en un 27 % hasta alcanzar los 26 700 millones de dólares.

Los Gobiernos de América Latina están infra gravando en la práctica tanto la riqueza individual como los beneficios empresariales, lo que está socavando su lucha contra el coronavirus, la pobreza y la desigualdad.Oxfam estima que América Latina perderá 113 400 millones de dólares en ingresos fiscales este año, lo que equivale al 59 % del gasto en salud pública de la región.

«Mientras que todos los demás están viviendo con órdenes de confinamiento, tratando de sobrevivir y con el temor de enfermarse, los milmillonarios latinoamericanos ven como su patrimonio y privilegios van generando más de 413 millones de dólares diarios desde el principio de la pandemia, todos y cada uno de los días», afirmó el director ejecutivo interino de Oxfam, Chema Vera.

“Los súper ricos nunca han tenido que preocuparse por ser desalojados por no pagar el alquiler o tener que decirles a sus hijos e hijas que hoy no hay nada que comer. Al contrario, han recolocado sus activos o invertido en más acciones, bonos, oro y bienes raíces, como ya lo hicieron después de la crisis económica mundial de 2008 y 2011.

“Mientras la gente muere y se enfrenta a la indigencia, la enfermedad y el hambre, es vergonzoso que un puñado de personas extremadamente ricas puedan estar amasando todavía más poder y riqueza. Si los Gobiernos no toman medidas para cambiar nuestros sistemas económicos, están echando gasolina al fuego del descontento contra las injusticias sociales que ahora están arrasando el mundo».

América Latina ya era la región más desigual del mundo. Los esfuerzos de los Gobiernos para combatir el coronavirus y salvar vidas se han visto frustrados por la desigualdad y la corrupción profundamente arraigadas, y el virus ahondará todavía más la enorme brecha entre los más ricos y el resto.

A pesar de haber activado uno de los confinamientos nacionales más rápidos y agresivos de América Latina, incluso antes que Francia y el Reino Unido, Perú tiene más de 366 550 casos registrados y una cifra de 13 767 fallecidos, el segundo país más afectado de América Latina después de Brasil y ahora uno de los peores focos del coronavirus del mundo.

Más del 70 % de la población peruana trabaja en la informalidad, sin contratos o protección, y sin seguridad laboral o licencias por enfermedad. Desde el comienzo del confinamiento el 16 de marzo, 2,3 millones de personas que viven en Lima, la capital de Perú, han perdido sus trabajos y la capacidad de alimentar a sus familias. Ya son 200 000 quienes han huido a pie de las ciudades a sus pueblos de origen en el campo, algunos llevándose el virus con ellos. Al mismo tiempo, los dos peruanos más ricos vieron aumentar su fortuna combinada en un 6 % hasta alcanzar los 5500 millones de dólares y Perú ha visto surgir otros dos nuevos milmillonarios.

El Gobierno peruano ayudó a las familias más pobres a sobrevivir mediante transferencias en efectivo de 100 dólares al mes, pero la desigualdad acabó con las buenas intenciones.

«Solo el 42 % de la ciudadanía peruana de 15 años o más tiene una cuenta bancaria y la mayoría de los beneficiarios de la ayuda del Gobierno, las personas más pobres del país, están fuera del sistema bancario. No les ha quedado más remedio que ir en persona al banco, donde las largas colas se han convertido en un terrible caldo de cultivo para el coronavirus. Vencer la pandemia significa vencer la desigualdad. También significa poner fin a los privilegios de unos pocos afortunados», declaró Vera.

El confinamiento de Perú implicó el cierre de todos los negocios excepto los proveedores de alimentos, medicinas y otros servicios esenciales. Sin embargo, solo una semana después, las grandes empresas mineras, petroleras y de agronegocios eludieron la orden, argumentando su importancia vital y estratégica para el país y prometiendo cumplir con estrictas medidas sanitarias. La realidad es que muchas de ellas no llegaron a aplicar medidas mínimas de mitigación de riesgos. La mina de cobre Antamina ha informado de 210 casos positivos por coronavirus, mientras que el 90 % de los empleados y empleadas de la compañía de aceite de palma Ocho Sur que se sometió a la prueba a principios de junio dio positivo, lo que supone una gran amenaza para las comunidades indígenas cercanas, que se encuentran entre las más desatendidas por el sistema de salud pública de Perú y que temen un elevado número de muertes. En la región amazónica donde opera la empresa, hay menos de ocho profesionales médicos por cada 10.000 habitantes.

En toda América Latina, 140 millones de personas, alrededor del 55 % de la población activa, se encuentran en la economía informal, y casi una de cada cinco vive en un tugurio. Hasta 52 millones de personas podrían caer en la pobreza en América Latina y el Caribe como consecuencia de la pandemia, con lo que la lucha contra la pobreza retrocedería 15 años.

En una región en la que ya una de cada tres mujeres se ve afectada por la violencia de género, las órdenes de permanencia en el hogar han dado lugar a un aumento de las denuncias de violencia doméstica y de asesinatos de mujeres y niñas. En Argentina, al menos 81 mujeres han sido asesinadas durante el confinamiento desde marzo de 2020.

En promedio, la inversión pública en salud de los países de América Latina es del 4 % del PIB, la mitad que los países miembros de la Organización de Cooperación y Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE). Décadas de privatización e inversiones insuficientes han dejado a los sistemas de salud pública de la región terriblemente mal preparados e incluso los han convertido en un factor que contribuye al aumento de las infecciones por coronavirus.

Para los más de 5 millones de personas migrantes venezolanas que viven en la región, la pandemia es una crisis doble. Tras huir del caos económico y político, millones de personas se han quedado sin trabajo debido a las cuarentenas. Muchas de ellas son indocumentadas y han caído en el olvido de las respuestas del Gobierno, incapaces de acceder a las transferencias de efectivo o a los servicios de salud. Desesperadas y a menudo sin hogar por no poder pagar el alquiler, 80 000 personas han vuelto sobre sus pasos por los Andes para retornar a Venezuela, donde incluso antes de la pandemia uno de cada tres venezolanos se enfrentaba al hambre.

Si se aplicara en 2020 un impuesto al patrimonio neto de entre el 2 % y el 3,5 % a quienes tengan más de un millón de dólares, los Gobiernos latinoamericanos podrían recaudar hasta 14 200 millones de dólares, que podrían ser invertidos en salud pública y protección social. Esta cifra es 50 veces la cantidad de lo que se podría recaudar este año de los milmillonarios de la región.

«El virus se ha expandido por América Latina no por indisciplina, sino por la desigualdad, ejemplificada por la enorme economía informal de la región y su falta de redes de seguridad, y por los Gobiernos que no gravan suficiente las grandes fortunas. La población se enfrenta a un dilema: quedarse en casa y pasar hambre o arriesgarse y salir a intentar ganarse la vida. Las grandes fortunas tienen una enorme deuda con nuestras sociedades y ya es hora de que paguen la justa parte que les corresponde», concluye Vera.

Notas para editores

Los cálculos de Oxfam se basan en las fuentes de datos más actualizadas y completas disponibles. Las cifras sobre las personas más ricas de la sociedad provienen de la Billionaires List de Forbes y del Real-Time Billionaires ranking de Forbes. Comparamos la riqueza neta de los milmillonarios latinoamericanos el 18 de marzo de 2020 con su riqueza neta el 12 de julio de 2020.

Durante ese período, el valor neto combinado de los milmillonarios en la Argentina pasó de 8800 millones de dólares a 11 200 millones de dólares; en el Brasil, de 123 100 millones de dólares a 157 100 millones de dólares; en Colombia, de 13 700 millones de dólares a 14 100 millones de dólares; en Chile, de 21 000 millones de dólares a 26 700 millones de dólares; en el Perú, de 5200 millones de dólares a 5500 millones de dólares; y en Venezuela, de 3400 millones de dólares a 3500 millones de dólares.

Únicamente tres países de América Latina aplican un impuesto sobre el patrimonio: Argentina (impuesto máximo del 1,25 %), Colombia (1 %) y Uruguay (1 %).

Descargue el informe más reciente de Oxfam sobre América Latina: ¿Quién paga la cuenta?

Desde el inicio de la pandemia, Oxfam ha proporcionado asistencia alimentaria, artículos de higiene y alojamientos temporales seguros a 250 000 de las personas más vulnerables de América Latina y el Caribe, gracias a su colaboración con más de 60 organizaciones socias en 11 países.

Información de contacto

Annie Thériault en Montreal (Canadá) | annie.theriault@oxfam.org | +51 936 307 990

Para actualizaciones, por favor siga a @Oxfam y @Oxfam_es

Le animamos a apoyar el llamamiento de respuesta al coronavirus de Oxfam.

Fuente: https://www.oxfam.org/es/notas-prensa/aumentan-los-mil-millonarios-de-america-latina-medida-que-la-region-mas-desigual

Imagen:  desinformemonos.org

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US teacher suspended after casting children of colour as slaves

North America/United States/02-02-2020/Author and Source: www.bbc.com

A teacher at a US elementary school has been suspended after casting two of her pupils of colour as slaves in a school play.

They were to be whipped by other children as part of the play featuring fifth graders – 10 or 11 year olds.

The parents of a mixed-race girl, aged 10, complained to the school and other officials in Hamden, Connecticut.

Carmen and Joshua Parker are calling for diversity training for teachers in the district.

Ms Parker did not think the play was an appropriate way of teaching children about slavery, and she was concerned about how black people were portrayed in it, she is quoted as saying by the New Haven Independent website.

«The scene starts with nameless slaves [number] one and two getting pushed towards the ship by the slave owner and a child is acting as the slave owner.»

«I was trying to make sense of the whipping of the children, the children were going to be whipping the slaves,» Mr Parker told local TV.

Ms Parker – who moved from Georgia to Connecticut to become assistant professor of psychiatry at Yale University to research racism in medicine – said no teacher at her daughter’s school in Georgia would have assigned that play to students.

The teacher, who is white, has been placed on administrative leave, pending the outcome of an investigation. A local schools official said the play was not a part of the curriculum, and that it had not been approved by the district.

Ms Parker said blaming the teacher was not the solution.

«Teachers are not the scapegoat for a system that is clearly broken and has been suppressing minority voices and the voices of those with disabilities,» she told a local education committee on Tuesday.

Sourse and Image: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51308746

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South Africa’s deficient education system

South Africa  /News 24

South Africa’s deficient education system is the single greatest obstacle to socio-economic advancement, replicating rather than reversing patterns of unemployment, poverty, and inequality, and effectively denying the majority of young people the chance of a middle-class life.

This emerges from a report, ‘Education the single greatest obstacle to socio-economic advancement in South Africa’, published by the Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA) at the Institute of Race Relations (IRR).

Set against data showing high rates of urbanisation – reflecting a common yearning for better-paying jobs, and a shot at middle-class life in a city – as well as a marked shift in the structure of the economy towards high-skills sectors, the research at once underscores the vital importance of education, and the devastating impacts of its most chronic deficiencies.

A new approach to schooling is urgently needed, according to author of the report, CRA director Frans Cronje, and should focus on achieving much higher levels of parental involvement and control, rather than bureaucratic control.

«On the strength of our experience and analysis», he says, «the quickest way to a much-improved education system would be to greatly strengthen the scope for School Governing Bodies and communities to control schools and exert their influence in the interests of their children».

The report acknowledges that much, in fact, has changed for the better in recent decades.

Positive outcomes include the fact that pre-school enrolment has soared by 270.4% since 2000, setting a much better basis for future school throughput, that the proportion of people aged 20 or older with no schooling has fallen from 13% in 1995 to 4.8% in 2016, and that the proportion of matric candidates receiving a bachelor’s pass has increased from 20.1% in 2008 to 28.7% last year.

The good news doesn’t end there.

Higher education participation rates (the proportion of 20–24 year olds enrolled in higher education) have risen from 15.4% in 2002 to 18.6% in 2015, with university enrolment numbers climbing 289.5% since 1985 and more than 100% since 1995.

The ratio of white to black university graduates was 3.7:1 in 1991, narrowing to 0.3:1 in 2015, and the proportion of people aged 20 and older with a degree has increased from 2.9% in 1995 to 4.9% in 2016.

But, in just short of a dozen bullet points, the grimmer side of South African education is laid bare:

  • Just under half of children who enrol in grade one will make it to Grade 12;
  • Roughly 20% of Grade 9, 10, and 11 pupils are repeaters, suggesting that they have been poorly prepared in the early grades of the school system;
  • Just 28% of people aged 20 or older have completed high school;
  • Just 3.1% of Black people over the age of 20 have a university degree compared to 13.9% and 18.3% for Indian and White people;
  • Just 6.9% of matric candidates will pass Maths with a grade of 70% to 100% – a smaller proportion than in 2008 (bearing in mind that, once the near 50% pre-matric drop-out rate is factored in, this means that around three out of 100 children will pass Maths in matric with such a grade);
  • The ratio of Maths Literacy (a B-grade Maths option) to Maths candidates in matric has changed from 0.9:1 in 2008 to 1.5:1 in 2016;
  • In the poorest quintile of schools, less than one out of 100 matric candidates will receive a distinction in maths;
  • In the richest quintile, that figure is just 9.7%;
  • Just one in three schools has a library and one in five a science laboratory;
  • The Black higher education participation rate is just 15.6%, while that for Indian and White people (aged 20–24) is 49.3% and 52.8%; and
  • The unemployment rate for tertiary qualified professionals has increased from 7.7% in 2008 to 13,2% today.

Author Frans Cronje notes: «The data makes it clear that education or the lack thereof is the primary indicator that determines the living standards trajectory of a young South African.

«In the second quarter of 2017, the unemployment rate for a tertiary qualified person was 13.2% – less than half the national average of 27.7%. Likewise, the labour market absorption rate for tertiary qualified professionals was 75.6% in 2017 as opposed to just 43.3% for the country as a whole.»

Three factors were particularly worrying.

«The first is the poor quality of Maths education. A good Maths pass in matric is in all probability the most important marker in determining whether a young person will enter the middle classes. While Maths education is poor across the board, the quality is worse in the poorest quintile of schools, leaving no doubt that school education is replicating trends of poverty and inequality in our society.»

The second is the low rate of tertiary education participation among black people.

Cronje warns that «it is futile to think that significant middle-class expansion, let alone demographic transformation, will take place as long as the higher education participation rate remains at around 15% for Black people».

The third is the «still very high» school drop-out rate.

«Just over half of [the] children will complete high school at all. In an economy that is evolving in favour of high-skilled tertiary industries and in which political pressure and policy are being used to drive up the cost of unskilled labour, this means that the majority of those children are unlikely to ever find gainful employment,» Cronje writes.

Putting these three concerns together, «you cannot escape the conclusion that the education system represents the single greatest obstacle to socio-economic advancement in South Africa».

«It replicates patterns of unemployment, poverty, and inequality and denies the majority of young people the chance of a middle-class life,» Cronje concludes. «The implications speak for themselves.»

– Morris is head of media at the Institute of Race Relations (IRR).

Fuente: https://www.news24.com/Analysis/south-africas-deficient-education-system-20180507

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Africa needs a revolution in education

Africa/April 17, 2018/by ISS Today/ Source: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za

Access to education must be markedly improved if Africa is to catch up with global averages. By Jakkie Cilliers and Stellah Kwasifor. 

While education worldwide, especially for girls, has improved, the gap between Africa and the rest of the world is wide and the continent doesn’t appear to be catching up. In fact, it is falling further behind.

From 1960 to 2015, the gap between the average number of years of education obtained by African adults aged 25 and above and that of the rest of the world increased from two to three years. Today African adults have, on average, five years of education while the rest of the world has around eight.

Globally the disparities are large. Adults in North America and Europe have 13 and 11 years respectively, while those in South Asia have seven years. Education levels are improving everywhere, but more slowly in Africa than anywhere else.

Source: Barro-Lee

Quality of education aside, countries now take less time to improve average years of education than in the past. Whereas it took around 17 years to increase average education levels in poor countries by one year in the 1960s and 70s, it now takes around 11 years. However while the rate of progress has generally sped up, Africa is falling further behind and will continue to do so, in part because of rapid population growth.

There are many well-known benefits of education. First, education affects demography through improved health (it reduces mortality) and reduced fertility rates (there are fewer children per female within childbearing age, meaning parents can better look after their children). In turn, demography affects improved education systems and opportunities in terms of size and characteristics of the school-going age of the population. Slower growth in pupil numbers allows poorer countries to cope with the requirement for more schools, books, teachers and other facilities.

Second, educational gains lead to improved productivity. A more literate and skilled workforce is more productive and can be engaged in higher value-add activities. For example, with grade 12 it may be possible to staff a call centre; with Grades 4 to 6, manual labour is probably the only option.

Third, better-educated people can increase their incomes, thus improving their economic circumstances. The relationship between higher levels of education and income is strong and almost linear. As workers progress from primary to secondary and eventually tertiary education, they are better positioned to increase earnings, sometimes dramatically. Education also promotes equity and democracy. A better educated citizenry can make more informed political choices.

Finally, improved levels of education reduce social inequalities where individuals can progress and be judged based on merit, with less importance being put on their social backgrounds, standing or other characteristics such as religion, race or caste.

Beyond these general positive features, attaining secondary education for females has numerous additional benefits. According to a widely quoted 1995 study by K Subbarao and Laura Raney, completion of secondary education would reduce the total fertility rate among women in developing nations by 26%. By comparison, doubling access to family planning would decrease the total fertility rate by only half that number.

Currently, only 14% of Africa’s low-income female population of the appropriate age group graduate from secondary school. For females in lower-middle-income Africa the portion is 48% and in upper-middle-income African countries it is 57%. The International Futures forecasting system from which these trends are extracted calculates that 122-million Africans are missing secondary school, slightly more than half of whom are female.

Economically, female education increases income of households when women enter the workforce and are gainfully employed. A 2003 study by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisationin 19 countries points out that a country’s long-term economic growth increases by 3.7% for every year that the adult population’s average years of schooling increases. Female education should therefore be a cornerstone of any nation’s strategy to ensure that women are empowered economically, socially and intellectually.

So how does Africa catch up with progress elsewhere?

More rapid economic growth rates would allow African governments to spend more money on education. Improved health care, the provision of water and sanitation and access to modern contraceptives would aid these efforts as they would reduce fertility rates over time. Fewer children would reduce the burden of spreading money too thinly, allowing those who enter the system to do better.

Urbanisation accompanied by improved facilities and services like water, electricity and educational material would promote quality education. Students would be better able to access amenities like the internet to aid learning – a resource that is largely absent and/or expensive in rural regions. This way, efficient education planning by these under-resourced governments can be achieved. More donor aid would also help.

But even more is needed for Africa to close its enduring education deficit compared to the rest of the world.

Given current backlogs and budgets, Africa would simply not be able to build enough schools and train enough teachers at the scale that is required. Neither would it be able to provide resources such as books and laboratories and all the associated support structures needed for functioning schools at that scale.

Some experts say Africa may be able to catch up by tapping into the digital revolution. Direct access to world-class education material should provide some added momentum. But even this requires African governments to invest heavily in the provision of internet access and the means to access such material.

The 2017 United Nations Children’s Fund report on the state of the world’s children points to the potential of information and communication technology to transform education by “expanding access to high-quality educational content, including textbooks, video material and remote instruction, and at a much lower cost than in the past”. The report warns, however, that technology cannot fix education without support from “strong teachers, motivated learners and sound pedagogy”.

Equally important, societies need to recognise the value of education, especially of girls, and provide an enabling environment to ensure gender equity in education. In north-east Nigeria, girls already lag behind boys in attendance, because of cultural barriers, the belief that girls’ education isn’t that important and the determined efforts by Boko Haram to deny education to females.

Whatever the combination of solutions, African governments will need to get serious about improving access to education. More of the same is not enough if the continent is to catch up with progress elsewhere. DM

Jakkie Cilliers is Head of African Futures & Innovation, ISS and chair of the ISS Board of Trustees. Stellah Kwasi is a researcher, African Futures & Innovation, ISS

Photo: Learners in a classroom in Cape Town. 8 May 2018. Photo by Leila Dougan

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Africa needs a revolution in education

 

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