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La crisis de la narración de Byung-Chul Han: el nuevo libro del filósofo que rompe todo

Byung-Chul Han es un filósofo nacido en Corea en 1959 pero que hizo toda su carrera académica en Alemania. Autor de casi 20 libros que vendieron muchísimos ejemplares en los últimos años, sale a escena con una nueva obra: La crisis de la narración.

Cada página de La crisis de la narración es una catarata de párrafos y párrafos que te dejan boquiabierto, asintiendo y agradeciendo la simpleza con la que Han consigue expresar ideas complejas. Cualquier lector o lectora sin formación filosófica puede leer a Han, solo hace falta curiosidad.

El autor contrapone la idea de narración a la idea de información. Toda narración se basa en el misterio y la magia; la información, en cambio, se sostiene en datos. La narración se cuenta junto al fuego de campamento, alguien habla, recuerda un recuerdo, lo mantiene vivo, juega modos antiguos de resolver contingencias nuevas, abre la posibilidad de futuro. Quien narra se reserva explicaciones, lo que hace que aumente la tensión narrativa. Alguien escucha, arma un nuevo recuerdo, se sostiene una comunidad, una familia.

La información, en cambio, son datos que se vuelven viejos muy rápido, datos que se amontonan y generan perfiles que el neoliberalismo utiliza para predecirnos y guiarnos al mejor postor, para controlarnos. Las redes sociales se llenan de esos datos, de selfies y de ‘me gusta’. Aquello que parece acercarnos, en realidad, solo nos aísla. Hoy estamos más informados que nunca pero andamos desorientados, buscando cómo reforzar identidades que tambalean.

Un tsunami de información que fragmenta la atención e impide la demora contemplativa que es constitutiva del narrar y de la escucha atenta. Las stories de las redes no son narraciones en sentido propio. No tienen extensión narrativa, son una mera sucesión de instantes que nada narran. La compulsión por las selfies se podría explicar según Han, más que por el narcisismo, por un aterrador vacío vital.

Otra diferenciación que plantea Han es entre estas narraciones que fundan y sostienen comunidades frente al uso que el Neoliberalismo hace de aquello que Han llama el storytelling, o la forma en que el marketing o la publicidad intentan adueñarse de narraciones, generando individuos aislados al convertir la historia en mercancía.

Es evidente (nos guste o no) que todos, que todas, en mayor o en menor medida andamos buscando en qué creer, en qué sostenernos, de qué agarrarnos cuando todo se vuelve inestable. En esa búsqueda podemos sumergirnos en las redes, que contrariamente a lo que pensamos nos aíslan más de los que nos acercan, o podemos buscar juntos esa historia que nos haga parte de una comunidad, una comunidad que nos cuide y nos dé cierta idea de futuro. El libro de Han es una herramienta valiosísima para orientarnos, para darnos cierta mirada distinta y sensible de una realidad que es tan evidente que parece, nos cuesta verla.

Fuente de la información e imagen:  https://www.cba24n.com.ar

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Corea del Norte impulsará la educación con robots de juguete

El robot ayudará a los niños a aprender matemáticas básicas, música e inglés. Corea del Norte reabrió las escuelas en junio del año pasado

Reuters.– Un robot de juguete con ojos azules fruncidos y una bandera norcoreana en el pecho deambula por un aula de una institución universitaria de Pyongyang, en una reciente demostración de herramientas destinadas a ayudar a los niños a aprender matemáticas básicas, música e inglés.

Las imágenes, emitidas por la televisión estatal norcoreana KRT, también mostraban otros dos robots de plástico más grandes, cada uno con una apariencia vagamente humanoide.

El líder norcoreano, Kim Jong-un, ha impulsado en los últimos años la reforma de la educación estimulando la innovación tecnológica y científica.

“Ayudo a enseñar tecnología educativa que mejora la inteligencia de los niños”, dijo la robot de 80 centímetros de altura con voz femenina, agitando los brazos.

Un segundo robot mostraba una cara sonriente en una pantalla incrustada dentro de una cabeza redonda blanca, mientras que otro llevaba un traje de plástico azul y anteojos con bordes blancos, según mostraron las imágenes de la KRT.

Park Kum-hee, profesora de una universidad en Pyongyang, dijo a KRT que el desarrollo de los robots educativos tuvo sus dificultades al principio, ya que los robots a menudo negaban con la cabeza cuando se les hacían preguntas tanto en coreano como en idiomas extranjeros.

“Mejorar la inteligencia de este robot fue difícil para mí, que me especialicé en psicología”, dijo Park. “Fueron las palabras de nuestro respetado camarada secretario general (Kim Jong-un) sobre la adopción de la tecnología de inteligencia artificial en la educación las que me guiaron siempre por el buen camino”.

Las imágenes de la KRT mostraban a alumnos de primaria con mascarillas repitiendo después del robot en clase de música, matemáticas e inglés. “Hola. Encantado de conocerte. Encantado de conocerte a ti también. ¿Cómo te llamas?”, decían dos niños en inglés al frente de la clase.

Corea del Norte reabrió las escuelas en junio del año pasado, pero obligó a los niños a llevar mascarilla en las clases e instalaron estaciones de limpieza.

El aislado país no ha informado oficialmente de ningún caso de coronavirus, pero ha impuesto estrictas medidas antivirus, como el cierre de las fronteras y la limitación de los viajes internos. Expertos han dicho que no se puede descartar un brote.

Corea del Norte impulsará la educación con robots de juguete

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Las escuelas de los campos de concentración de Corea del Norte: la experiencia de Shin Dong-hyuk

Por: Fernanda Ibáñez

El libro “Evasión del Campo 14” describe cómo en estos campos de concentración los alumnos de primaria asisten a clases seis días a la semana, y los de secundaria siete días, con solo un día libre una vez al mes.

La historia de Shin Dong-hyuk es una de las más importantes a contar si se quiere conocer sobre la experiencia educativa en Corea del Norte, ya que es una de las escasas personas de la que se tiene conocimiento que ha nacido, crecido y escapado de uno de los campos de concentración de este país.

Shin Dong-hyuk vivió en dos campos de concentración diferentes, desde su nacimiento en el campo 14 y su niñez en el campo 18 hasta que escapó a China a sus 23 años. Después de unos años llegó a adentrarse en el mundo occidental donde vivió por un tiempo en California (Estados Unidos) y en Corea del Sur. Hoy en día se dedica a ser voz de los crímenes contra la humanidad que se están cometiendo en su país natal. En el 2012 el periodista estadounidense Blaine Harden, estuvo dispuesto a escuchar su historia, y años después publicaron el libro, Evasión del Campo 14, que está basado en esta historia y el cual relata su niñez y adolescencia dentro de los campos de concentración, su escape victorioso y su adultez. Se ha buscado popularizar el relato de Shin porque no se conoce a otra persona que haya vivido en algún campo de trabajo norcoreano que hoy en día pueda contar lo que realmente pasa dentro de estos. Se sabe de la existencia de estas instalaciones, porque en el libro se relata que gracias a imágenes satelitales de Google Maps, se pueden alcanzar a ver las estructuras, pero es algo que el mundo ha decidido ignorar. Para muchas personas, Corea del Norte puede ser un país sumamente lejano, ya que la cultura se encuentra alienada gracias a la dictadura totalitaria que ha gobernado por 70 años en el país.

Muchas personas desconocen que los campos de trabajo de Corea del Norte han existido veinte veces más que los campos de concentración Nazis y el doble de tiempo que el Gulag soviético. Conocidos como los campos de trabajo forzado que se establecieron en la Unión Soviética, los Gulag comenzaron a operar de 1919 a 1987 donde Gorbachov comenzó el proceso para clausurarlos. De acuerdo con la historia de Shin relatada en el libro, a estos campos de trabajo se pueden mandar a familias completas y hasta formar familias dentro del mismo. Se tiene una rutina en donde todos los prisioneros trabajan, ya sea en maquiladoras, agricultura, ganadería, entre otros, además de escuelas, casas y colonias.

La educación básica de Shin fue llevada a cabo dentro de uno de estos campos de trabajo forzado. Su familia llegó ahí debido a que fueron acusados de traición. A diferencia a la del resto del país, la educación de los niños dentro del campo es aún más limitada, ya que, ante el sistema de castas, ellos son considerados como la más baja. De acuerdo a una investigación realizada por el Dr. Gianluca Spezza acerca de la educación en Corea del Norte, sabemos que hay un sistema de castas en el país. Las instituciones son completamente públicas, ya que las privadas están prohibidas por el régimen, y son accesibles para la clase media. La clase alta la conforman personas que tienen una relación cercana con la familia Kim, y gracias a sus recursos tienen oportunidades más amplias, que a veces pueden incluir hasta universidades prestigiosas en el extranjero. La educación para la clase media se encuentra en constante monitoreo de organizaciones como la ONU o UNICEF, en donde investigaciones como las anteriores, nos dejan ver que el régimen prioriza la educación de ideologías y no las materias educativas.

Dentro del Campo 14, la escuela se describe como un cúmulo de edificios. El libro relata que como recompensa por hacer un buen trabajo a los ojos de los maestros, a los alumnos se les entrega un pedazo de jabón, debido a que un derecho tan básico como el de la higiene y la salud, está condicionado al desempeño. A los alumnos se les enseña cómo dirigirse a los maestros; pararse erguidos, saludar y nunca mirarlos a los ojos. Los alumnos de primaria atienden clases seis días a la semana, y los de secundaria siete días, con un día libre una vez al mes. Las faltas no son permitidas, sin importar el estado físico de un alumno, los maestros se encargaban de checar la asistencia dos veces al día.

No se tiene conocimiento del concepto de literatura, solamente se les enseña a escribir y leer en el alfabeto coreano, a través de ejercicios en papel. Los recursos son escasos, describe el libro, a los alumnos se les da un cuaderno con 25 páginas para todo el año escolar. Los lápices son un recurso inaccesible, por lo que, de acuerdo con el testimonio de Shin, se veían obligados a usar madera carbonizada para escribir, además de que no sabían de la existencia de las gomas para borrar. La enseñanza de las matemáticas consta de sumas y restas básicas, pero no multiplicación ni división, por lo que Shin, hasta el día de hoy, no sabe multiplicar.

La educación física consistía en correr y jugar en el patio, donde algunas veces los alumnos corrían al río y recogían caracoles para regalar a su maestro. Las pelotas no eran permitidas, y eran inexistentes en el país. La primera vez que Shin vio una pelota fue cuando escapó a China. En las escuelas ubicadas en estos campos de trabajo no se enseña geografía, ni historia (ya sea mundial o de su mismo país). La población no tiene conocimiento de los países vecinos, y se les dice a los alumnos que Corea del Norte es un estado independiente. Las preguntas no son permitidas en las escuelas y los castigos físicos y la brutalidad son el método más común para mantener el orden. Uno de los recuerdos más violentos de Shin es la muerte de una niña dentro del aula. Fue apaleada por su maestro después de que fue descubierta por llevar granos de arroz robados en sus bolsillos. Otro castigo común, es que los docentes nieguen comidas, ya que son consideradas un premio por hacer una labor escolar o de trabajo bien hecha.

De acuerdo con Blaine Harden, autor del libro, la meta a largo plazo de estas escuelas es muy implícita, y se refleja en lo que no se enseña. El modelo básico de las instituciones se basa en intimidar a los alumnos para que no busquen información. Un ejemplo de esto es que las familias nuevas que llegan al campo y que vienen del exterior, no son integradas con los prisioneros que han vivido ahí todas sus vidas, sino que son colocadas en la parte aislada del campo o en otras prisiones. Con el objetivo de que las personas dentro no tengan conocimiento de qué pasa más allá de la cerca. Todo esto ayuda a los maestros a “moldear” las mentes y los valores de los alumnos sin la contradicción de niños o personas que han estado fuera del campo y conocen otra vida.

Unos de los adoctrinamientos más inhumanos que se usan en estas escuelas consiste en acondicionar a los alumnos para que, cada vez que son castigados corporalmente, piensen que se lo merecen porque están limpiando el crimen que ellos, o sus familias, cometieron para llegar al campo. Esto de acuerdo al testimonio de Shin plasmado en el libro. Además de que son entrenados para ser “soplones”, reportar disidentes o rebeldes conlleva recompensas y beneficios. Esto evitaba que se construyera un sentido de comunidad, porque no había base para la confianza ni la construcción de relaciones interpersonales. Harden relata que los efectos psicológicos de este tipo de adoctrinamiento podían tener consecuencias a largo plazo.

La experiencia de Shin Dong-hyuk relatada en Evasión del Campo 14 pone en cuestionamiento la etiqueta de un educando a la de un prisionero, y nos adentra en este contexto. Cabe destacar que su testimonio original fue corregido hace unos años, resultando en una nueva versión de su historia en la que Shin admite que algunos de los datos del libro son falsos, mientras que otros se mantienen. Él mismo explicó que no logró revelar todos los detalles de su historia por miedo a represalias, ya que fue lo primero que se le preguntó cuando fue recibido como refugiado en Corea del Sur. Sin embargo, el valor del testimonio de Shin Dong-hyuk no se encuentra en la exactitud de su historia, si no en cómo nos acerca a la experiencia de una persona que vivió estos eventos, que merece contar su historia, y que nosotros la escuchemos.

Fuente e imagen:  Observatorio de Innovación Educativa (tec.mx)

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Corea del Norte: How Extreme Flooding in the DPRK Affects Daily Life

How Extreme Flooding in the DPRK Affects Daily Life

With contributions from aid workers.

The North Korean people have faced truly extreme humanitarian challenges in 2020. Before this summer, the DPRK was dealing with high levels of chronic malnutrition and severe economic disruptions caused by COVID-19 shutdowns and ongoing sanctions. The multiple typhoons that have hit over the past few weeks causing widespread flooding around the country exacerbate an already difficult year. Even after decades of visiting the North, it is devastating to witness the array of grave humanitarian difficulties that the North Korean people must endure. Sadly, humanitarian assistance for relief, recovery and rebuilding is unlikely to be delivered any time soon.

The Tyranny of Geography

The topography of the Korean Peninsula, featuring steep mountains and narrow valleys, makes it vulnerable to flooding; every mid-summer, it receives significant rainfall. In a normal season, as much as half of the annual rainfall can come during the roughly month-long “rainy season” that ordinarily begins in late June and ends by mid-July. As long as the rain showers are gentle, the hillside vegetation and natural drainage system of creeks, lakes, reservoirs and rivers can absorb and remove the excess water without widespread damage. But if the rainy season is prolonged, or if typhoons bring high winds and dump large amounts of rainfall in a short period of time, the system is quickly overwhelmed, causing mudslides, large-scale flooding and crop damage, loss of homes and infrastructure, and lives.

2020 Has Been a Bad Year

The rainy season of 2020 was prolonged and heavy, and was followed by three typhoons that struck different parts of the country in a two-week period: Bavi (August 26-27), Maysak (September 2-3) and Haishen (September 7). These storms brought further damage to already hard-hit communities, and new levels of hardship to other cities and regions that were spared mass flooding earlier in the season. Meanwhile, the risk from more typhoons continues into the fall.

According to a September 16, 2020 Pyongyang Times article, the summer of 2020 brought the second-highest level of precipitation recorded in the DPRK in the last 25 years. During the typhoons, the North Korean government issued emergency warnings and permitted unusual live, on-the-scene reporting showing significant flooding in Wonsan (North Korea’s fifth-largest city) and other areas. Yet so far, although the current flooding is likely much worse and more widespread than prior years, North Korea has neither publicly requested outside assistance nor shared precise damage estimates or casualty figures. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, the fight against the pandemic has been the government’s top priority, meaning tight quarantine measures and travel and economic restrictions remain in place. These priorities were further reiterated on August 14 when Kim Jong Un reportedly said at a Politburo meeting, “The worsening coronavirus situation around the globe calls for tighter border closures and stricter virus prevention measures, and not allowing any outside assistance whatsoever regarding the flood damage.” However, even though detailed casualty and damage figures are not available, much can be gleaned from the broadcast footage and experience gained from extensive United Nations (UN) and NGO travel and prior humanitarian engagement in the country.

The View From Ground Zero

The Korean Peninsula north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) ranges from coastal rice-growing areas and lowlands planted with corn, soybean, vegetables, fruit trees and other crops, to mountainous areas. Steep mountain slopes are drained by small creeks running down narrow valleys, feeding into larger rivers that meander through agricultural areas, villages and towns to the sea. On previous visits to the North, aid workers have seen firsthand the widespread devastation that happens when too much water falls in these vulnerable areas in too short a time. Homes, schools, clinics and other buildings rim the edges of the narrow valleys, and when heavy rains hit steep slopes, the small creeks that drain these valleys turn into rushing torrents that soon sweep away everything in their path. Mountainsides lacking in cover vegetation can quickly become saturated and slough off, burying buildings below in mud. Standing water around the base of mud-brick buildings can cause them to “melt” and collapse. Outhouses and open waste channels are soon overrun, contaminating the floodwaters. Perimeter walls built for security collapse. Phone and electric lines are severed. Rural dirt roads turn into mud, making the surface impassible. Bridges break as abutments wash away.

As the ground becomes saturated and rivers overflow, nearby croplands are inundated. Crops like corn, soybean and rice that were weeks away from being harvested instead risk rotting in the fields. Farmers and community members will do what they can to try to salvage crops by tying them up, to hopefully allow them time to finish ripening for harvest. But if the damage is too widespread, it is simply an overwhelming task.

Swollen rivers inundate towns, uproot trees and vegetation, wash away topsoil, and deposit rocks, refuse and waste that have been pulled into the churning waters. Entire towns can be swept away, the landscape forever changed once the waters recede. It will take months of backbreaking work to rebuild homes, roads, rail lines and bridges and to remove debris from agricultural fields. With topsoil buried or washed away, the productivity of affected fields is often reduced going forward, making life even harder for those working the ground.

In the immediate aftermath of flooding, those who have lost their homes and personal belongings may be housed in the small apartments or residences of family or friends, or find shelter in community buildings, while communities try to rebuild housing. In some cases, “shock troops” of soldiers or organized volunteer laborers from various sectors of the society may be sent by the government to quickly reconstruct devastated homes and other buildings in larger communities. But in poorer areas, it seems that local communities and even individual families are left to try to rebuild and repair on their own—with few resources, an already overburdened workload and with winter just around the corner.

Inundated or partially inundated homes must be repaired; mounds of mud must be removed and belongings cleaned—yet in most cases, the only water available for cleaning is contaminated. Kitchen gardens that individual households heavily depend on must be immediately replanted, but that may be impossible if seed stocks have been lost in the flooding. People who are already malnourished and suffering will struggle even more for basic survival in the coming weeks and months from increased incidence of diarrhea caused by contaminated water sources, the sudden loss of food stocks, garden produce, or fuel, and the hugely increased workload.

Help Is Not on the Way

The damage to the roads alone makes it very difficult for relief supplies, if available at all, to be delivered. Remote communities can be entirely cut off for days or weeks while mudslides are removed, often by hand, and roads are repaired enough to restore even basic travel. Furthermore, under normal circumstances, September and October are some of the busiest months in the DPRK as they are critical for harvesting the main food crops of corn, rice and soybean. Roads must be passable in order for crops to be harvested and moved from the fields to the threshing areas and out for distribution, and electricity lines and supply must be restored in order to run the threshing machines.

The virtual closure of the border with China and the halt in nearly all external relief shipments since January 2020 out of concern for COVID-19 will make longer-term recovery efforts even more difficult. Vehicles of all kinds are needed for rebuilding efforts—to transport building materials like sand, gravel and concrete. But the parts and tires needed to keep these vehicles operational usually come from China. With trade cut off due to COVID-19 quarantines, many of these vehicles will break, further limiting transportation and supply networks. Similarly, while greenhouses have greatly expanded food production in the shoulder seasons between late fall and early spring, the supply of replacement greenhouse plastic is critical—which has also very likely been significantly curtailed due to border closures related to COVID-19 measures.

People injured during the flooding or the rebuilding effort have no option but to seek treatment at clinics or hospitals that are overwhelmed and ill-equipped to feed or house them, let alone provide them with significant medical help. Besides those already at the margins of society and highly vulnerable to shocks of any kind (children under five, pregnant and nursing women, the elderly, the disabled, those who are sick, etc.), those who lost their homes to the flooding, and communities most affected will be particularly vulnerable to increased rates of malnutrition. As people crowd together in small spaces due to the loss of shelter, there is not only the potential for the spread of COVID-19, but also the transmission of more common communicable diseases like tuberculosis or multidrug-resistant tuberculosis.

Perhaps most devastating is the emotional impact and disruption caused by the loss of loved ones, homes or livelihoods on people already on a knife-edge of survival, and the overwhelming workload. Usual tasks must be completed (on top of urgent flood restoration duties at both the community level and at the household level) before the cold of winter sets in. For millions of North Koreans, the challenge is formidable but help will not be on the way until outside humanitarian assistance and related travel is again facilitated by North Korea, a reality recognized on September 11 by US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun in remarks to the National Committee on North Korea (NCNK):

We recognize that North Korea is facing an unusually severe set of challenges this year that perhaps is making it more difficult for Pyongyang to make the decision to engage. But I can assure you we will be ready when the DPRK is ready. In the meantime, it is critical that we and the international community remain focused on the humanitarian challenges faced by the North Korean people.

Conclusion

Even after visiting the DPRK over two decades, it is heartbreaking to witness the damage and setbacks caused by floods. This year, it is even more difficult to see the devastation on communities and lives from afar without being able to lend a helping hand.

Fuente de la Información: https://www.38north.org/2020/09/nkflooding092320/

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Corea del Norte: Why the United States Needs a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights

Why the United States Needs a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights

As the Biden administration turns its attention to North Korea, it should signal its support for human rights by reappointing a special envoy for the position on North Korea left vacant for the past four years. The reappointment will give meaning to US President Joseph Biden’s vow to return values to US foreign policy. It will also alert North Korea that ending its isolation and joining the rest of the international community, and especially normalizing its relations with the United States, will have to be accompanied by a lessening of oppression of the North Korean people. Denuclearization will remain the overriding objective of US policy toward North Korea, but human rights and humanitarian issues will play an important part.

Background

In 2004, Congress, with strong bipartisan support, created the special envoy position “to coordinate and promote efforts to improve respect” for the human rights of North Korea’s people. The envoy’s responsibilities, as set forth in the North Korea Human Rights Act, include “discussions with North Korean officials” and “international efforts” with other states, especially at the United Nations. Congress reauthorized the Act three times, most recently in 2018 with a unanimous vote. But the Trump administration, alleging the need to save costs, proposed “dual-hatting” the envoy’s functions to another US Department of State position, which was then eliminated. In the House of Representatives, the Republican and Democratic co-chairs of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission appealed unsuccessfully to the president in 2018 to fill the post so that human rights could be effectively incorporated into talks with North Korea.

Why Now?

President Biden has expressed his commitment to restoring values in American foreign policy and more broadly, to promoting human rights and democracy abroad. To dismiss the human rights situation in North Korea would be contrary both to US values and its national security interests. What makes the reappointment of a special envoy so compelling is the extraordinary nature of North Korea’s human rights situation. For the past 75 years, Kim family rule has largely cut off the people of North Korea from the rest of the world, put them under heavy surveillance, and enforced its authority with political prison camps, public executions, forced labor and other grave abuses. Many have had to endure chronic hunger, poor or non-existent medical care and extreme poverty.

President Obama described North Korea’s government as “probably the worst human rights violator in the world.” President Trump himself told Congress, “no regime has oppressed its own citizens more totally or brutally than the cruel dictatorship in North Korea.” In 2014, the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry (COI), after a yearlong investigation, found the Kim government to be committing “crimes against humanity”—the most serious human rights violations—on a systematic basis as state policy.[1]

President Biden has also emphasized the need for the US to promote its values by strengthening America’s relations with other democracies. The United Nations is one of the most promising forums for a united front on human rights in North Korea, and a special envoy is sorely needed there to promote multilateral cooperation on the protection of human rights. North Korea’s human rights situation is on the agenda of the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council, and the UN Commission of Inquiry’s nearly 400-page report in 2014 has made recommendations that are waiting to be implemented.

The previous envoy, Robert King, together with representatives from the European Union, Japan and South Korea, played a robust role in mobilizing states to adopt and co-sponsor resolutions on the human rights situation, and in particular to endorse the COI’s creation and its findings. With additional allies like Australia, the coalition successfully placed the issue on the Security Council’s agenda—the highest UN body—from 2014-2017 so that attention could be drawn to the impact of North Korea’s human rights conditions on international peace and security. But after 2018, the human rights situation in North Korea remained absent from the Security Council agenda, and in 2019 the US withdrew its support from the effort; in 2020, only a private (unofficial) meeting was held.

The UN’s Human Rights Council was also in disarray. Neither the US, South Korea, nor Japan co-sponsored the human rights resolution in 2019, and at the General Assembly, South Korea failed to co-sponsor the resolution on North Korean human rights in 2019 and 2020. Clearly, an envoy is needed to build back unity on this issue so that the full potential of the UN forum can be mustered.

The Nexus Between Human Rights and Security

Within the US government, an envoy is needed to develop a coherent strategy on promoting human rights in North Korea that is meshed with negotiations over nuclear weapons and other security issues. Over the past four years, the Trump administration has used human rights as a pressure point one moment and then dropped it at another—achieving, in the end, neither the nuclear agreement for which forsaking human rights was presumed necessary nor building trust in any other area. But nuclear security arrangements require trust as well as effective verification.

The denuclearization and human rights agenda are inextricably intertwined, observed Korea specialist Victor Cha. “The threat” posed by North Korea stems not only from nuclear weapons but from a government possessing those weapons that is “capable of a level of abuse of its own citizens unprecedented in modern human history.” Improvements in North Korea’s human rights conditions “would reflect the leadership’s commitment to reform and make a denuclearization commitment by the DPRK more credible.”

Respect for human rights has even been called the ultimate test of whether Pyongyang will come through on any nuclear deal. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the DPRK has called for “a binding agreement” to be negotiated in the course of peace and denuclearization talks, “requiring” North Korea to “cooperate with the United Nations human rights mechanisms and engage with and grant access to independent human rights monitoring…”[2]

An envoy sensitive to both human rights and security concerns can help integrate human rights and humanitarian issues into a comprehensive policy. The envoy can coordinate with all the pertinent bureaus and offices in the State Department, National Security Council and government departments while assuring that human rights and humanitarian concerns are reflected in major statements of the US president, the US secretary of state, the UN Ambassador and other senior officials, and are added to Group of Eight (G8) or comparable communiques and promoted in dialogues with China and other governments.

An Agenda for the Special Envoy

Special Envoy King found that he was able to raise human rights concerns with North Korean officials, including a first vice foreign minister, in the course of discussions about humanitarian aid in 2011. He was further able to gain the release on humanitarian grounds of an American detained for six months in North Korea on unspecified charges. To encourage North Korea to hold talks in the future, political and economic incentives could be applied in a comprehensive policy.

Integrating human rights concerns in other policy areas would also be important, for example, making sure workers’ rights are included in any commercial or development arrangement that might arise, that significant women’s participation is insisted upon in NGO-funded training programs, or that food and medical aid be stringently monitored and distributed equitably so as to reach the most vulnerable, including those in detention facilities, a point accepted by North Korea in 2019 at the UN Universal Periodic Review.

The special envoy’s expertise would further come into play in evaluating the extent to which North Korean human rights practices warrant the lifting of US sanctions. Under the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, for sanctions to be suspended, North Korea must show progress in prison conditions, the release of political prisoners, the repatriation of abducted foreigners, family reunification meetings, and the cessation of censorship and other political restrictions.[3] Although such provisions can presumably be waived on national security grounds, explaining them to North Korean officials should be a part of discussions.

A prioritizing of human rights issues would also be important. Some argue that the most sensitive concerns should not be among the initial ones raised with North Korea. King, for example, recommends that given North Koreans’ limited access to information, “We could press the North Koreans for more contact, for more openness, more travel for North Koreans” and encourage greater “flow of information.” Others recommend beginning with what is called “low hanging fruit,” or topics to which North Korea might be more amenable, involving women, the disabled or greater access to orphanages. Still others believe it’s time to raise the tougher issues because they are widely known, given the COI report, the consensus adoption of General Assembly resolutions since 2016 and US legislation on the subject.

North Korea, it is pointed out, has in the past made some concessions when it found it in its interest, such as admitting the existence of reeducation through labor camps, releasing a small number of abducted Japanese, allowing into the country the UN special rapporteur on disabilities, and even negotiating with a humanitarian organization in recent years to allow its entry to prisons for health reasons, although the effort to date has failed to come to fruition.

Conclusion

If the United States is truly interested in addressing human rights in North Korea, it must begin by appointing a special envoy. The envoy’s public education and liaison roles have had ripple effects internationally with NGOs, academics, think tanks and governments; the encouragement of increased broadcasting into North Korea by Voice of America and Radio Free Asia has also had an impact inside the country.

North Korea would certainly become far less of a danger to the world if it could be encouraged to move toward a more open society with respect for human rights. Both Presidents Carter and Ronald Reagan, in their dealings with the highly nuclearized former Soviet Union, found that the promotion of human rights reinforced their strategic objectives. President Biden should follow their example. North Korea cannot be expected to honor a nuclear weapons agreement and normalize relations without opening up its country to scrutiny.


  1. [1]

    United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/CRP. 1, para. 1160, February 7, 2014, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_25_crp_1.pdf.

  2. [2]

    United Nations, General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/74/275, para. 5, August 2, 2019, https://undocs.org/en/A/74/275.

  3. [3]

    US Congress, House,  North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, HR 757, Sec. 401., 114th Congress, became law February 18, 2016, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/757/text?overview=closed.

    Fuente de la Información: https://www.38north.org/2021/01/why-the-united-states-needs-a-special-envoy-for-north-korean-human-rights/

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New Life for the Third Network

New Life for the Third Network

When hundreds of houses and apartments were completed last year, North Korean media showed residents entering their new homes, welcomed with a pile of household goods. On the wall of each home was something else provided by the state: a dedicated receiver for the country’s secretive third radio network that relays daily news, instruction, and propaganda.

The network has been around since the 1950s and was understood to have become less important in recent years due to the country’s constant electricity problems, but that is set to change.[1]

At the recent Worker’s Party Congress, Kim Jong Un called for the third network (referred to as “wire broadcasting”) to be improved throughout the country:

“It is needed to readjust the wire broadcasting and cable TV networks, put the relevant technology on a higher level and provide full conditions for the people in all parts of the country, ranging from cities to remote mountain villages, to enjoy a better cultural and emotional life.”

Kim’s call comes as the country appears to be embarking on a new crackdown on foreign media and the third radio network could play an important part in that effort.

Closed Network

The third radio network mirrors similar closed broadcasting networks that existed in other Soviet bloc nations. In contrast to over-the-air signals which can be received outside of the country, the third network provides a way for the state to speak directly to citizens about more sensitive matters. This can include criticism of actions that are against the law, such as consuming foreign media.

The system allows for local broadcasting at the city or town level. While programming from Pyongyang occupies a large part of the day, provincial or city-level programs are provided for a few hours. This includes local news, civic information and mobilization instructions, and can get very personal with citizens named and shamed for arrests and law breaking, according to interviews with escapees.

If the system is working properly, it can be a powerful tool to lecture citizens daily.

A Central Intelligence Agency assessment of the third radio network in 1962 concluded that the network and its nationwide reach “offers a simple and quick means for the indoctrination of the masses in the more remote areas of the country.”[2]

But recent escapees have said the system has fallen into disrepair. In many cases the signal is weak and difficult to listen to, if audible at all, they say.

Revitalization

Revitalization work will fall to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, which manages the network. On January 30, state television showed ministry workers dutifully studying the account of Kim’s speech in the newspaper and pledging to follow through on his wishes.

How they plan to do this wasn’t explained. Electricity is still a scarce commodity, but the video footage of new houses indicates the third network is still a basic part of North Korean life.

The scale of the network is vast. The ministry began building the network in early 1950s and the 1962 CIA report said it grew from 5,000 receivers in 1953 to 794,000 at the end of 1961.[3] On Communications Day in 1982, state media reported the network “complete,” although didn’t specify exactly how large it had grown.[4]

Just over a decade later, the country was plunged into famine as the economy collapsed and the network’s distribution cables and receiver boxes were plundered for scrap metal. The impact of those actions in combination with electrical power problems have hampered its effectiveness ever since.

Crackdown

Kim’s call to improve the third broadcast comes as the country appears to be embarking on a new crackdown on foreign media. In December, the Supreme People’s Assembly adopted the “Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture,” according to state media reports.

The law is a timely example of the use of closed networks by the state.

Details of the law and its penalties have not been disclosed by any North Korean media that can be monitored from overseas. Doing so would highlight the problem of foreign media and culture on the country. Instead, the state is disseminating details to citizens through the weekly propaganda lectures that all North Koreans must attend and, almost certainly, through the third radio network where it can be heard.

Alongside the new law, the state is also responding to the influx of foreign media by strengthening and expanding its own offerings. North Korea is expanding the availability of multi-channel television throughout the country via digital TV and intranet broadcasting. Up to four channels are now available in areas with the expanded service.

That was referenced in Kim’s call to improve “cable TV networks” alongside “wire broadcasting.” In this case, cable TV refers to the use of a wired network to carry TV signals to areas that have no over-the-air reception.


  1. [1]

    “Economic Intelligence Report – Post and Telecommunications in North Korea 1953-61,” CIA Office of Research and Reports, June 1962.

  2. [2]

    Ibid.

  3. [3]

    Ibid.

  4. [4]

    KCNA, July 2, 1982, via FBIS. https://ntrl.ntis.gov/NTRL/.

     

    Fuente de la Información: https://www.38north.org/2021/02/new-life-for-the-third-network/

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The Rise of Women Leaders in North Korea

The Rise of Women Leaders in North Korea

Since Kim Jong Un came to power, North Korean media has carefully curated the public image of both his wife and sister, a departure from how women were portrayed in the Kim Jong Il era. But they aren’t the only women in Pyongyang’s inner circles—several have been promoted to powerful political and diplomatic roles in recent years. While it may not have much impact on his policy decisions in the long run, the fact that Kim Jong Un has opened doors to some women is particularly striking given the historically male representation of power and politics in North Korea.

The Kim Dynasty as the Source of Women’s Leadership

North Korea’s national history abounds with images of women as revolutionaries—whether as soldiers, workers or symbolic “mothers” to the nation, especially the mothers, wives and consorts of the Kim dynasty. Official history calls Kim Il Sung’s mother the “mother of Choson,” upheld as pure legend in the cult of the Kim family. Kim Jong Suk (Kim Il Sung’s first wife and mother to Kim Jong Il) and Kim Hwak Sil (called “the Woman General” of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army) were exceptional women in the independence movement who fought alongside men in battle, upheld as unshakeable and committed revolutionaries (Park 1992-1993).[1]

Kim Il Sung’s second wife, Kim Song Ae, was officially introduced to the public in the 1960s, and received titles such as chairman of the Democratic Women’s Union and held meetings for foreign female delegates.[2] She sought to expand her political clout—positioning her children as possible heirs—making her a formidable challenger to Kim Jong Il’s claim to leadership. By the 1970s, she lost her position as head of the women’s committee and in 1981, as Kim Jong Il consolidated power, was placed under house arrest.[3]

Kim Jong Il, on the other hand, never appeared with his wives and consorts—Hong Il Chon, Song Hye Rim, Kim Yong Suk and Ko Yong Hui—because he reportedly did not like them to be involved in political activities.[4] A notorious womanizer, he largely kept his partners in secluded mansions and apartments, and purportedly preferred them to focus on their motherly duties.[5]

Kim Jong Un’s Rule and Female Leadership

It seems that Kim Jong Un has taken a different tack than his father or grandfather, and is surrounding himself with notable women in high-level positions, suggesting a potential shift for women among a new generation of leaders. These include (listed in alphabetical order):

  • Choe Son Hui has been North Korea’s first vice minister of Foreign Affairs since 2018. Fluent in English, she takes a leading role in DPRK relations with the United States, having previously served as director of MOFA’s North American department. She was involved with the Six Party Talks and nuclear negotiations. She is the adopted daughter of Choe Yong Rim, honorary vice president of the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium and a former premier.
  • Hyon Song Wol is a popular singer and leader of the Moranbong Band and Samjiyon Orchestra who has taken on greater political responsibilities since 2017, when she was appointed to the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. She serves as vice director of the powerful Propaganda and Agitation Department under Kim Yo Jong and often appears in her stead in that role as well as is often included on delegations to inter-Korean events, including her 2018 trip to South Korea. That visit, scheduled as part of increasing inter-Korean engagement in the lead-up to the Pyeongchang Olympics, dominated South Korean news, and is considered a diplomatic success.
  • Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Un’s aunt, appeared as a frequent advisor and confidant during the early years of his rule. Kim Jong Il promoted her to a four-star general (despite having no known military experience) in the Korean People’s Army at a Party Conference in 2012—listed next to Kim Jong Un the first time his name appeared in North Korean media.[6] While she frequently appeared with Kim Jong Un beginning in 2010, she was not seen in public after her husband was executed in 2013, until earlier this year when she was photographed seated with Kim Jong Un and his family at a Lunar New Year’s concert in January. Her role in family affairs is unclear, although she likely helps handle patronage networks.
  • Kim Song Hye serves as head of the secretary bureau of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, the counterpart to South Korea’s Minister of Unification. She has experience working on North-South relations and has been involved with talks since the 2000 Inter-Korean Summit. Kim has been part of several delegations to visit South Korea, including during the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics. In 2019, it was reported that she, along with several other delegates to the Hanoi Summit, faced detention and investigation following the lack of the summit’s success.
  • Kim Yo Jong serves as her brother’s de facto right-hand (wo)man, and has been given broader responsibilities within the Politburo, where she has been an alternate member since April 2020. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service claims that Kim Jong Un has delegated part of his authority to aides, including his sister, to “oversee state affairs,” although it is unclear what this means in practice. South Korean and US media has speculated why she hasn’t appeared in public since late July. She was not seen at two key Political Bureau meetings on August 13 and August 25. Some analysts have suggested that she is lying low to decrease suspicion that Kim Jong Un has ceded too much authority to her because of ill health. It is just as possible that the Kim family is limiting their exposure to the public as part of anti-epidemic measures.
  • Pak Myong Sun has a leading role in economic affairs, and is likely the head of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Light Industry Department—the third woman to hold this position in North Korea’s history and the second not related to Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il. Pak Myong Sun and Kim Yo Jong are currently the only women in the Politburo.
  • Ri Sol Ju, Kim Jong Un’s wife, was conferred the ceremonial political title of “First Lady” of North Korea in 2018 ahead of summits with South Korea and the United States, presumably to match the titles of Kim Jung-sook and Melania Trump, the first ladies of South Korea and the United States, respectively. The title hadn’t been used since 1974, when it was used to refer to Kim Il Sung’s second wife. She accompanies Kim Jong Un at domestic political meetings like the Party meetings as well as site visits and summits with foreign leaders.

Implications of Elite Female Leadership

It is sometimes assumed that greater inclusion of women may change policy content. That may be the case in democracies, but the increased participation of North Korean women in elite politics does not necessarily indicate change to the broader social or political systems. Studies of political influence in other authoritarian and hybrid regimes suggest that women’s inclusion in national politics actually reproduces—not challenges—norms, representation and control mechanisms that reinforce existing political institutions.

In North Korea, successful female political leaders have toed the party line closely. Choe Son Hui has drawn a tough line on the possibility of dialogue with the United States. One of the “prime authors” of the plan for sanctions relief, Kim Song Hye, reportedly worked closely with Kim Yo Jong in the lead-up to the Hanoi Summit and the visit to South Korea during the Winter Olympics. Hyon Song Wol leads North Korea’s cultural diplomacy activities, bringing delegations of North Korean artists to South Korea and China. And Kim Yo Jong worked as a hardline counterbalance to Kim Jong Un’s earlier engagement with US and South Korean leaders, sending confusing messages via the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).[7]

North Korean women have played a strong role in neighborhood politics since the founding of the country and have been at the forefront of changes in the local economy since the Chollima movement started in the 1950s, not to mention their important role in marketization following the Great Famine. For now, it is noteworthy the extent to which women do work in high-level positions in varied sectors of politics, diplomacy and the economy. It seems that at the very least, being female is not a disqualifier for gaining influence in Kim Jong Un’s regime.


  1. [1]

     

  2. Kyung Ae Park, “Women and Revolution in North Korea,” Pacific Affairs, 65, no. 4 (Winter 1992-1993): 527-545.

  3. [2]

    Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong-il’s Leadership of North Korea (London: Routledge, 2008).

  4. [3]

    Jing-sung Jang, Dear Leader: My Escape from North Korea, trans. Shirley Lee (New York: 37Ink/Atria, 2014).

  5. [4]

    Lim, 2008.

  6. [5]

    Jung Pak, Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights Into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator (New York: Random House, 2020).

  7. [6]

    See: Ken Gause, “North Korea’s Political System in the Transition Era: The Role and Influence of the Party Apparatus,” in North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society, ed. Kyung-Ae Park and Scott Snyder (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013); and Peter M. Beck, “North Korea in 2010: Provocations and Succession,” Asian Survey. 51, no. 1 (2011): 33-40.

  8. [7]

    “Press Statement by Kim Yo Jong, First Vice Department Director of Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea,” KCNA, July 10, 2020.

    Fuente de la Información: https://www.38north.org/2020/09/ddraudt092520/

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